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REVIEW ESSAYS
THE PROMISE OF THE OPPRESSION REMEDY:
A REVIEW OF MARKUS KOEHNEN'S
OPPRESSION AND RELATED REMEDIES
The oppression remedy found in the Canada Business
Corporations Act' and most provincial corporate law statutes2 pro-
vides courts with the discretion to move beyond the technical legal
rules that bind corporate stakeholders and consider whether a com-
plainant's reasonable expectations have been defeated. Where those
expectations have been defeated, courts are provided with a broad
discretion to craft a remedy to rectify the matters contested by the
oppressed party.3 For example, courts can order the corporation (or
any other person) to purchase securities from a security holder, or
to compensate an aggrieved person.'
The concept of oppression in corporate law, with its accompanying
focus on equality and minorities, conjures up an image of corporate
law operating in the public interest. It was the lure of the language
surrounding the oppression remedy in Canadian corporate law that
prompted Poonam Puri and myself to embark on an empirical study
of the remedy, the precise contours of which were fuzzy at best.6
After reviewing all reported oppression cases between 1995 and
2001, we reported in 2004 that the remedy had developed as a
mechanism to protect minority investors in closely held corpora-
tions from the exercise of majority control.7 We noted, however,
that in recent years Canadian courts had granted the remedy, in
certain limited instances, to creditors of closely held corporations
1. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 241 (CBCA).
2. Quebec and Prince Edward Island do not have oppression remedies in their corporate
law statutes. For a review of the differences in the provincial corporate statutes, see
Ronald J. Daniels, "Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive
Corporate Market" (1991), 30 McGill L.J. 130.
3. CBCA, supra, footnote 1, s. 241(3).
4. Ibid., s. 241(3)(g).
5. Ibid., s. 241(3)(j).
6. Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Poonam Puri, "The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially
Considered: 1995 - 2001" (2004), 30 Queen's L.J. 79.
7. Ibid., at p. 81.
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and minority shareholders of widely held corporations. While we
were concerned with the reluctance of Canadian lawyers and the
judiciary to expand the remedy to a broader range of corporate
stakeholders, we were impressed by the judiciary's willingness to
craft creative remedies for successful actions.8 We concluded that
the oppression remedy had a great deal of potential to deal with
unequal power relations in both widely and closely held Canadian
corporations, provided that both the judiciary and the lawyers that
appear before it developed it in this manner.9
Since our study was published Canadian courts have released
three high-profile decisions considering the oppression remedy. In
addition, in contrast to the dearth of writing on the remedy at the
time that we embarked on our study, over the last year Canada Law
Book" and Thomson Carswell 2 each published a book on the
oppression remedy written by prominent Canadian commercial
litigators. 3 This short review essay draws on Markus Koehnen's
Oppression and Related Remedies to suggest that the remedy
continues to be useful to minority shareholders of closely held
8. Ibid., at p. 108.
9. Ibid.
10. Catalyst Fund General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., 2004 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 8022,
1 B.L.R. (4th) 186 (Ont. S.C.J.) (hereafter Hollinger); Peoples Department Stores Inc.
(Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564, 2004 SCC 68 and
Stelco Inc. (Re), 2005 CarswellOnt 1188, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 238, 253 D.L.R. (4th) 109,
motion to stay refused 196 O.A.C. 260.
11. Sonia L. Bjorkquist, Allan D. Coleman and David S. Morritt, The Oppression Remedy
(Aurora, Canada Law Book, 2004).
12. Markus Koehnen, Oppression and Related Remedies (Toronto, Thomson Carswell,
2004).
13. At the time we engaged in our study, full-length texts devoted to the oppression rem-
edy had not been published. A number of brief case comments were published by prac-
titioners in various professional publications and the following articles were represen-
tative of the academic commentary on the Canadian oppression remedy: Kevin E.
Davis and Edward M. lacobucci, "Reconciling Derivative Claims and the Oppression
Remedy" (2000), 12 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 87; Jason W. Neyers, "Is There an
Oppression Remedy Showstopper?: O'Neill v. Phillips" (2000), 33 C.B.L.J. 447; Mary
Condon, "Pandora's Box or Trojan Horse?: Recent Developments in the Use of the
Oppression Remedy under the CBCA" (1994), Meredith Mem. Lect. 465; Markus
Koehnen, "The Oppression Remedy: Reasonable Expectations: Naneff v. Con-Crete
Holding Ltd." (1994), 73 Can. Bar Rev. 274; Jeffrey G. Macintosh, "Bad Faith and the
Oppression Remedy: Uneasy Marriage, or Amicable Divorce?" (1990), 69 Can. Bar
Rev. 276; Michael Rice, "The Availability of the Oppression Remedy to Majority
Shareholders in Ontario" (1989), 16 C.B.L.J. 58; Karen C. Ulmer, "Business Issues:
The Oppression Remedy" (1989), 53 Sask. L. Rev. 209; and Jeffrey G. Macintosh,
"The Retrospectivity of the Oppression Remedy" (1987), 13 C.B.L.J. 219.
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corporations, and has also been expanded to creditors and minority
shareholders of some widely held companies. Both Koehnen's book
and the emerging case law demonstrate that Canadian lawyers and
judges have an increased understanding and ability to apply the
remedy to these contexts.
The central claim in this essay is that if the development of the
oppression remedy for shareholders and creditors is not matched
by the development of the remedy to deal with the reasonable
expectations of non-shareholder/creditor corporate stakeholders,
the remedy will create legal incentives for boards to exploit or at
the very least disregard the interests of non-shareholder/creditor
stakeholders. That is, if the remedy is interpreted in a manner that
provides protection to creditors and shareholders, and not to other
stakeholders, it may interfere with the wide latitude currently
accorded to boards of directors by other parts of Canadian corpo-
rate law to pursue the. best interests of the corporation." For
example, such an interpretation of the remedy may cause boards
and management to focus more closely on minority shareholders
and creditors at the expense of protecting jobs and securing
favourable treatment for workers and other corporate stakeholders.
The remedy would create legal incentives for boards and manage-
ment to behave in this manner. This interpretation of the remedy
would also limit any possibility for relief through the courts from
such conduct where the reasonable expectations of non-shareholder/
creditor corporate stakeholders have been defeated. Such a result is
inconsistent with the original promise of the oppression remedy
as articulated by the Dickerson Committee's position that the
14. See Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law"
(2005) (unpublished, manuscript on hand with author) applying the Team Production
Theory developed by American corporate law scholars Margaret Blair and Lynn
Stout to argue that Canadian corporate law's understanding of public corporations
that are not controlled by a single shareholder or group of shareholders can be better
explained by the director primacy norm than the shareholder primacy norm.
Canadian corporate law provides that directors of such public corporations with
widely held share ownership and voting rights are free from direct control of any cor-
porate stakeholders. Rent allocation among Canadian corporate stakeholders depends
on extra-legal advantages. A potential departing point for the Canadian experience,
the oppression remedy, continues to develop to deal with such extra-legal advantages
rooted primarily in unequal power relations among corporate stakeholders. However,
in its current application the oppression remedy does not provide any given stake-
holder group with an ability to dominate the board of public corporations and obvi-
ate the director primacy norm.
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oppression remedy is the broadest of all Canadian corporate law
remedies. "
Part I briefly outlines and considers the three recent high-pro-
file decisions concerning the contours of the oppression remedy
and the implications of the judicial rhetoric produced in these deci-
sions. This part suggests that these oppression remedy decisions
may be interpreted in a manner that assists minority shareholders
and creditors at the expense of other more vulnerable corporate
stakeholders. Commercial litigators, especially those who are
writing in the area, play a key role in determining the way that
these decisions will be interpreted. Part 2 situates Koehnen's book
within this context and highlights the key contributions that
Oppression and Related Remedies makes for lawyers and judges'
understanding of the remedy.
1. Peoples, Hollinger and Stelco
In November 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada released
Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 6 which has
prompted much academic debate as well as commentary and atten-
tion from lawyers. 7 The Supreme Court upheld the Quebec Court
of Appeal's decision to not impose on the directors of Peoples a
fiduciary duty to that company's creditors. In addition, the Supreme
Court applied the business judgment rule to limit the duty of care
owed to the creditors of Peoples. The court held that "the interests
of the corporation are not to be confused with the interests of the
creditors or any other stakeholders". 8 In reaching this decision it
relied heavily on the existence of the oppression remedy in
Canadian corporate law and the Dickerson Committee's rhetoric on
15. Robert W.V. Dickerson, John L. Howard and Leon Getz, Proposalsfor a New Business
Corporations Law for Canada (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971), vol. 1.
16. Supra, footnote 10.
17. See for example Catherine Francis, "Peoples Department Stores Inc. v. Wise: The
Expanded Scope of Directors' and Officers' Fiduciary Duties and Duties of Care"
(2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 175; Wayne D. Gray, "A Solicitor's Perspective on Peoples v.
Wise" (2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 184; Warren Grover, "The Tangled Web of the Wise Case"
(2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 200; Ian B. Lee, "Peoples Department Stores v. Wise and the 'Best
Interests of the Corporation'" (2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 212; St6phane Rousseau,
"Director's Duty of Care after Peoples: Would It Be Wise to Start Worrying about
Liability?" (2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 223; and Jacob Ziegel, "The Peoples Judgment and the
Supreme Court's Role in Private Law Cases" (2005), 41 C.B.L.J. 236.
18. Peoples, supra, footnote 10, at para. 43.
16-42 C.B.L.J.
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the remedy.'9 In addition, it held that an oppression remedy analysis
is different from a fiduciary duty analysis.
2
1
The Peoples decision may be interpreted to expand the availabil-
ity of the oppression remedy. A broad interpretation suggests that
while the possibility of an action by creditors based on a breach of
fiduciary duty is limited by a broader construction of the corpora-
tion and its stakeholders, oppression actions based on similar
conduct may be pursued. However, given past jurisprudence this
interpretation is unlikely to be followed by Canadian courts.
Appellate courts before Peoples had given the direction that the
judicial application of the oppression remedy is to be divorced from
a fiduciary duty analysis." This direction has not had a significant
impact on how the judiciary has engaged in its analysis of oppres-
sion actions.2 As a practical matter, judges draw on their overall
knowledge of corporate law in dealing with the relatively few
oppression actions that they are faced with each year. 3 As a result,
judicial treatment of the oppression remedy has frequently drawn
from the case law on breach of statutory duties and imported from
that source the analysis of concepts such as the best interests of the
corporation and the business judgment rule.
Only a few weeks after Peoples was released, in Catalyst Fund
General Partner I Inc. v. Hollinger Inc.,24 pursuant to an application
brought by Catalyst, a non-voting public shareholder of Hollinger,
Colin Campbell J. removed the majority of Hollinger's board of
19. Ibid., at para. 60.
20. Ibid., at para. 51.
21. See for example Brant Investments Ltd. v. KeepRite Inc. (1991), 3 O.R. (3d) 289, 45
O.A.C. 320 (C.A.), affg 60 O.R. (2d) 737, 42 D.L.R. (4th) 15 (H.C.), supp. reasons 43
D.L.R. (4th) 141n, where the Court of Appeal held at p. 301:
It must be recalled that in dealing with s. 234, the impugned acts, the results of the
impugned acts, the protected groups, and the powers of the court to grant remedies
are all extremely broad. To import the concept of breach of fiduciary duty into that
statutory provision would not only complicate its interpretation and application,
but could be inimical to the statutory fiduciary duty imposed upon directors in
s. 117(1) (now s. 122(1)) of the CBCA).
22. See for example, cw Shareholdings Inc. v. wic Western International Communications
Ltd. (1998), 39 O.R. (3d) 755, 160 D.L.R. (4th) 131 (Gen. Div.) and Pente Investment
Management Ltd. v. Schneider Corp. (1998), 40 B.L.R. (2d) 244 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.
Div.)), affd 42 O.R. (3d) 177 sub nom. Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp., 113
O.A.C. 253 (C.A.).
23. See for example, Ben-Ishai and Puri, supra, footnote 6, at p. 81, where the authors
noted there were 71 cases that dealt with the oppression remedy on its merits between
January 1995 and November 2001.
24. Supra, footnote 10.
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directors using the power granted to him by the oppression remedy
in the CBCA. The relief was sought because Hollinger made a loan
to its parent company, Ravelston, that was not in the best interests
of Hollinger. Prior to Hollinger, the oppression remedy had been
primarily applied to closely held corporations with a small number
of shareholders, an absence of a public market for the corporation's
shares, substantial shareholder participation in the management of
the corporation, and shareholders who were generally linked by
family or other personal relationships. The closely held corporation
can be contrasted with the widely held company, where the share-
holder is normally a passive investor with little knowledge or
interest in the other shareholders or management of the corporation.
The general inapplicability of the oppression remedy to widely
held corporations is based on the idea that in such companies power
is centralized in the hands of the board of directors. In contrast, in
closely held corporations the board is often controlled by the share-
holders holding a majority of the voting power. As a result, the
controlling shareholders of closely held corporations can cause the
board to act in ways that are detrimental to the minority shareholders.
For example, a minority shareholder's employment can be termi-
nated, dividends might not be declared, minority shareholders can
be removed from management, and majority shareholders might be
given high compensation at the expense of the corporation. Similar
actions may be taken in a widely held corporation. There, however,
minority shareholders can exit more easily by selling their shares in
the public market.
Like Peoples, Hollinger may be interpreted to expand the avail-
ability of the oppression remedy. Hollinger may be used to argue
that the oppression remedy is now available to minority share-
holders of widely held corporations. However, the existence of a
dual-class share structure suggests an alternative interpretation. The
prevailing distinction made in oppression remedy case law before
Hollinger ignored the fact that in the Canadian context the line
between a widely held corporation and a closely held one is often a
difficult one to draw. There are a significant number of widely held
corporations in Canada that employ a dual-class share structure and
operate in a manner similar to the traditional closely held corpora-
tion. Canadian corporations with dual-class shareholding structures
generally have share structures that provide for different voting and
dividend rights among the control-block holders, who are generally
2005]
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family members, and the corporation's public shareholders.
Canadian corporations that have dual-class share structures account
for approximately 20 to 25% of those listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange.25 Campbell J. went to great lengths to justify his decision
to remove the board members by highlighting the fact that the pub-
lic controlled only 12% of Hollinger's voting shares.26 Accordingly,
Hollinger may represent a new sensitivity to this common structure,
rather than an expansion of the oppression remedy to minority
shareholders of all widely held corporations.
Most recently, in the context of Stelco's reorganization under the
Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act, 27 Blair J.A. considered
Hollinger and applied Peoples to overturn Farley J.'s earlier deci-
sion to remove two board members who represented shareholder
interests. 28 The employee stakeholders in the Stelco reorganization
had argued that because of their commitment to shareholder inter-
ests, the two directors would not be able to serve in a neutral capac-
ity. Blair J.A. used the rhetoric in Peoples to hold that directors
should not be removed merely because of the reality in the
Canadian context that they have relationships with powerful stake-
holders, provided they act in the best interest of the corporation
broadly defined. 29 While the employees did not bring an oppression
action, Blair J.A. considered whether such a suit would be success-
ful. He concluded that it would not be and distinguished the Stelco
circumstances from the Hollinger situation, where Campbell J. held
that there was evidence of the directors acting in their own best
interests and not in the best interests of the corporation."
Taken together, Hollinger, Peoples and Stelco may be interpreted
to suggest that Canadian courts could be willing to grant relief to a
significant number of minority shareholders and creditors using the
oppression remedy. However, when situated in the historical con-
text of the judicial application of the remedy and the specific facts
of each of the cases, such a result is unlikely. At the same time, it is
25. Shareholder Association for Research and Education, "Second Class Investors: The
use and abuse of subordinated shares in Canada" (April 2004), online at
<http://www.share.ca/files/pdfs/SHARE%2ODual%20Class%20-%20finall.pdf> at
p. 5 .
26. Hollinger, supra, footnote 10, at para. 6.
27. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
28. Stelco, supra, footnote 10, at paras. 77-78.
29. Ibid., at paras. 59-60.
30. Ibid., at para. 56.
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uncertain how these decisions will be interpreted and applied by the
judiciary. There is no doubt that lawyers practicing and writing in
this area will play a significant role in dictating the nature of the
development of this remedy. If an approach that favours increasing
availability of the remedy to minority shareholders and creditors is
advocated, while a continued resistance to expanding the remedy to
other corporate stakeholders (such as the employees in Stelco) is
maintained, this will have significant implications for how boards
and management treat these other corporate stakeholders. The next
part of this review considers Oppression and Related Remedies in
this context.
2. Oppression and Related Remedies
Markus Koehnen's general goal in Oppression and Related
Remedies is to address his discomfort with the amount of discretion
courts have in applying the oppression remedy. To do this he pro-
vides commercial litigators and the Canadian judiciary with core
principles that he has distilled from his in-depth analysis of the judi-
cial treatment of the doctrine. Consistent with his general goal, it is
clear from the first chapter of Oppression and Related Remedies
that Koehnen's intended readership is one that is familiar with the
oppression remedy. It is not until chapter 3 that Koehnen engages in
a discussion of the oppression remedy generally that would be of
benefit to readers unfamiliar with the concept.'
Koehnen begins in chapter 1 by situating the oppression remedy
within its historical context. He traces the existence of the remedy
from the problematic decision in Foss v. Harbottle32 and its prohi-
bition on shareholder suits for corporate harms, to the introduction
of the remedy in the CBCA in 1975. Unlike most other commentaries
on the development of the doctrine, Koehnen provides some insight
into the political economy of the remedy. He notes provincial ten-
sions and disagreement on the extent of courts' involvement in
management of corporations, which ultimately led to the adoption
of the remedy in all provincial corporate law statutes except for
those of Quebec and Prince Edward Island.33 Koehnen observes
that, unlike Ontario, which initially rejected the introduction of the
31. Koehnen, supra, footnote 12, c. 3.
32. (1843), 2 Hare. 461, 67 E.R. 189 (V.C.).
33. Koehnen, supra, footnote 12, at p. 6, note 24.
2005]
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remedy,34 British Columbia was the first province to adopt the rem-
edy (in 1960) and later to expand it to include a broader definition
of oppression (in 1975). 31
Chapter 2 addresses which complainants have standing to bring
an oppression action. In a CBCA action, for example, complainants
include security holders, directors and officers, the Director and any
other person whom the court identifies as a "proper person".36
Koehnen notes that the standing provisions for oppression actions
in Canadian corporate law statutes are the broadest in the common
law world.37 However, he fails to highlight that in practice the
"proper person" test has only been used to extend complainant sta-
tus to creditors.38 A complete discussion of how and when standing
has been extended to creditors is followed by a few sentences on
employees.
A helpful addition to chapter 2 would be a discussion that moves
beyond the case law on employees as complainants and outlines
principles for when it would be appropriate for employees to be
granted standing as a proper person. The limited discussion of
employee standing in oppression actions in chapter 2 reflects a
theme that persists throughout the book: scant attention is given to
vulnerable corporate stakeholders. A later example in chapter 2,
Koehnen's discussion of representative actions39 and class actions,4"
focuses on whether such actions could provide a vehicle for minor-
ity shareholders to overcome the financial obstacles to bringing an
oppression action but ignores other corporate stakeholders. A dis-
cussion of the implications of the availability of a representative
oppression action and the blurry state of the law on oppression
actions brought as class actions for other corporate stakeholders
would have enriched this section.
Chapters 3 through 5 trace the contemporary concept of reason-
able expectations that underlies the oppression remedy to Ebrahimi
v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd.4 There the House of Lords attempted
to give substance to the concept of unfairness by considering the
34. Ibid., at p. 5.
35. Ibid.
36. CBCA, supra, footnote 1, s. 238.
37. Koehnen, supra, footnote 12, at p. 7.
38. Ben-Ishai and Puri, supra, footnote 6, at pp. 97-104 and 108.
39. Koehnen, supra, footnote 12, at p. 61.
40. Ibid., at p. 67.
41. [1972] 2 All E.R. 492 (H.L.).
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reasonable expectations of the parties. Koehnen effectively pulls
together common situations where Canadian courts have found that
minority shareholders' reasonable expectations give rise to a suc-
cessful oppression action.12 He highlights the sources that courts
have generally found appropriate to look for such expectations,
such as past practices of the parties. 3 Koehnen builds on the analy-
sis of reasonable expectations by providing descriptions of common
categories of oppression." He provides examples that include divi-
dends," management fees, 6 corporate opportunities 7 and self-
dealing. 8 In addition, he provides a set of questions that highlight
when Canadian courts have used the business judgment rule to limit
the availability of an oppression action. For example, are the bene-
fits and burdens flowing from the decision mutual or one-sided? 9
These questions will be useful for lawyers who have been engaged
to provide advice to boards on defending an oppression action or
taking pro-active steps to avoid one." Next, Koehnen employs a
similar analysis to consider when an oppression action can be used
to address conduct in the context of a plan of arrangement,' a
going-private transaction 2 or a squeeze out 3 that is oppressive to
minority shareholders.
In addition to chapters 3 through 5, which are useful for lawyers
acting for a shareholder or creditor considering whether to bring an
oppression action, chapters 8 through 10 are also helpful in deter-
mining the nature of the remedy that should be sought.4 These three
chapters provide a comprehensive discussion of the wide-ranging
remedies courts have granted for successful actions and the prin-
ciples that they have used to balance their desire to give meaning to
parties' reasonable expectations and at the same time minimize judi-
cial interference in corporate affairs. This analysis is also helpful in
42. Koehnen, supra, footnote 12, ch. 3.
43. Ibid., at pp. 88-105.
44. Ibid., ch. 4.
45. Ibid., at p. 131.
46. Ibid., at p. 130.
47. Ibid., at p. 127.
48. Ibid., at p. 124.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., at p. 113.
51. Ibid., at p. 169.
52. Ibid., at p. 196.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., chs. 8-10.
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framing responses to the various remedies that a complainant in an
oppression action might seek.
Chapters 6 and 7 are the most significant in terms of articulating
the prevailing position held by Canadian lawyers who play a role in
shaping the development of the oppression remedy. Koehnen's dis-
cussion of directors' duties in chapter 6 suggests that if his under-
standing of the oppression remedy and how it should develop is
taken seriously, the significance of the discussion of the best inter-
ests of the corporation in Peoples may be limited. Koehnen
describes the prevailing understanding among the commercial bar
before Peoples as "the best interests of the corporation are typically
defined as the benefits of the shareholders as a whole".5 The dis-
cussion in of takeover bids in chapter 7 is also used to argue that
even in that context directors are obliged to take into account the
best interests of the shareholders as whole, not the best interests of
the corporation. 6
The reasoning in Peoples runs against Koehnen's understanding
of directors' duties. However, if lower courts adopt the Supreme
Court's direction that an oppression remedy analysis is different
from a fiduciary duty analysis, it is possible that Koehnen's
approach could be applied to oppression actions. In Peoples,57 the
Supreme Court of Canada applied to the bankruptcy and reorgani-
zation context the reasoning developed in the takeover context,
which Koehnen argues stands for the proposition that directors are
obliged to act in the best interests of shareholders as a whole. The
court held that
in determining whether they are acting with a view to the best interests of a
corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case,
for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of shareholders,




Even prior to Peoples, the role of directors of widely held corpora-
tions as set out in Canadian law departed from the understanding that
Koehnen articulates. The primary legal role of directors is to "manage,
or supervise the management of, the business and the affairs of the
corporation".5 9 Canadian law does not grant shareholders any power to
55. Ibid., at p. 203.
56. Ibid., ch. 7.
57. Peoples, supra, footnote 10.
58. Ibid., at para. 42.
59. CBCA, supra, footnote 1, s. 102(1).
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initiate action or to control the board. For example, a review of
Koehnen's discussion in chapter 11 of the procedural obstacles to
bringing a derivative action6° suggests that directors are not consti-
tuted as shareholders' agents. Rather, Canadian law provides boards
with wide latitude in pursuing the best interests of the corporation.
If the oppression remedy is developed so that it can be used to pro-
tect creditors from oppressive conduct by directors, and the remedy
is made available to minority shareholders of widely held corpora-
tions yet continues to be limited in its application to other corpo-
rate stakeholders such as employees, the oppression remedy may
represent a departure from the role corporate law currently accords
directors of widely held corporations. The prevailing position held
by the commercial bar on how the remedy should develop, as
articulated by Koehnen, may in fact cause corporations to be run in
the best interests of the shareholders as a whole, and sometimes
creditors.
The development of the oppression remedy suggested by
Koehnen's book, which is consistent with a possible interpretation
of recent case law, would result in directors acting on behalf of
majority shareholders, but subject to fair treatment of minority
shareholders and creditors as protected by the oppression remedy.
To the extent that directors of public corporations are accorded a
high level of independence by corporate law to pursue the best
interests of the corporation, the oppression remedy would limit this.
The result would be that the remedy would actually facilitate the
exploitation, or at the very least disregard of corporate stakeholders
other than shareholders and creditors, rather than uphold their rea-
sonable expectations. Following the reasoning in Stelco, it is likely
that, in this context, if a corporate stakeholder such as an employee
claimed that she has been treated unfairly the independent legal role
of directors would still be pointed to by the courts to justify their
reluctance to intervene. However, as in Hollinger, if a creditor or
minority shareholder brought a claim for unfair treatment, Canadian
courts would operate on the understanding that directors of public
corporations generally act on behalf of majority shareholders, and
would intervene to ensure that relatively powerful corporate stake-
holders such as creditors and minority shareholders were treated
fairly.
60. Koehnen, supra, footnote 12, ch. 11.
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3. Conclusion
Markus Koehnen is to be applauded for putting together a
comprehensive text on the oppression remedy. The critique and
questions raised in this review are not leveled against his book, but
rather at the predominant understanding of the remedy held by
commercial litigators, which Koehnen does an excellent job of
articulating in Oppression and Related Remedies. Only with the
development of texts like this can the implications of a broader
application of the remedy be considered from the perspective of all
corporate stakeholders. From the perspective of non-shareholder/
creditor corporate stakeholders, in the short term limiting the
oppression remedy to minority shareholders of closely held corpo-
rations may be more appealing than developing the remedy. In the
long term, however, if the perspective currently represented by the
texts written by commercial litigators on the oppression remedy is
built on with writing that offers a principled approach for considering
non-shareholder/creditor corporate stakeholders' interests in applying
the remedy, there is a possibility that the promise of the oppression
remedy may be realized for a broad range of corporate stakeholders.
Stephanie Ben-Ishai*
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. The author
is grateful for the comments provided by Poonam Pur and Vaughan Black. The excel-
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